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 Abstract 
In the sociological literature on social mobility, the long-standing convention has been to assume that 
intergenerational reproduction takes one of two forms, either a categorical form that has parents 
passing on a big-class position to their children, or a gradational form that has parents passing on their 
socioeconomic standing to their children. These conventional approaches ignore in their own ways the 
important role that occupations play in transferring advantage and disadvantage from one generation 
to the next. In log-linear analyses of nationally representative data from the United States, Sweden, 
Germany, and Japan, we show that (a) occupations are an important conduit for reproduction, (b) the 
most extreme rigidities in the mobility regime are only revealed when analyses are carried out at the 
detailed occupational level, and (c) much of what shows up as big-class reproduction in conventional 
mobility analyses is in fact occupational reproduction in disguise. Although the four countries studied 
here differ in the extent to which the occupational form has been institutionalized, we show that it is 
too prominent to ignore in any of these countries. Even in Japan, which has long been regarded as 
distinctively “deoccupationalized,” we find evidence of extreme occupational rigidities. These results 
suggest that an occupational mechanism for reproduction may be a fundamental feature of all 
contemporary mobility regimes. 
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Introduction1 
The scholarly literature on social mobility has long been fixated on questions about the amount of 
mobility and has paid little attention, by contrast, to the logically prior question of the form that mobility 
takes. The convention among mobility scholars has simply been to assume that intergenerational 
reproduction takes one of two forms: (a) class scholars have sought to model how parents pass on 
their social class to children; and (b) gradationalists have sought to model how parents pass on their 
socioeconomic standing to their children. Under both approaches, detailed occupations are treated as 
the appropriate starting point in representing the underlying structure of inequality, but they are 
deemed unusable in disaggregate form and are transformed either by aggregating them into big 
classes (i.e., the class approach) or by scaling them in terms of their socioeconomic status or prestige 
(i.e., the gradational approach). The study of mobility has in this sense been reduced to the study of 
either class or socioeconomic reproduction, yet quite strikingly these simplifying assumptions have 
come to be adopted with little in the way of evidence that they adequately characterize the structure of 
unequal opportunity.  
Is it possible that both class and gradational representations are incomplete and obscure important 
rigidities in the mobility regime? The purpose of our paper is to show that indeed these simplifying 
representations provide only partial accounts of mobility and that the full extent of inequality is only 
revealed by supplementing them with a third representation that treats occupations as fundamental 
conduits of reproduction. Because occupations are often deeply institutionalized social groups, we 
suggest that they play a featured role in intergenerational reproduction, a role that has gone largely 
unappreciated in conventional mobility analyses. We will ask whether occupational reproduction is a 
generic feature of late industrialism by comparing the mobility regimes of the United States, Germany, 
Sweden and Japan. 
The skeptic might contend that, after decades of relentless research on social mobility, it is hardly 
likely that any important misunderstanding of its structure could have gone undetected and have per-
sisted. This reaction, while understandable, fails to appreciate that the class-based approach to ana-
lyzing mobility tables has been so dominant as to preclude any meaningful experimentation with alter-
native representations (e.g., Breen 2004; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992a; Sobel, Hout, and Duncan 
1985). With few exceptions, sociologists have focused on describing and modeling mobility  
                                                     
1 Early drafts of this paper were presented at Umeå University, Göteborg University, Rand Corporation, the 37th 
World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, Research Committee 28 of the International 
Sociological Association, Nuffield College, Stanford University Law School, and the University of California-Los 
Angeles. We thank the participants in these seminars for their comments. We also thank Hiroshi Ishida for 
sharing his occupational coding protocols with us and for assisting us in interpreting the Japanese results. The 
research reported here was supported with grants from the National Science Foundation (SBS-9906419), the 
Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research (FAS D2001-2893), Cornell University, Stanford 
University, and the Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES). 
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among big classes, and the decision to begin analysis with a big-class table has gone largely un-
challenged (but see Stier and Grusky 1990; Rytina 1992; 2000). Although the main competitor to a 
big-class formulation, that of gradationalism, was once popular within sociology (e.g., Blau and 
Duncan 1967; Featherman and Hauser 1978), it has by now been superseded by big-class analysis 
and thus lives on principally within economics in the form of increasingly popular analyses of income 
or earnings mobility (e.g., Solon 2002; Bradbury and Katz 2002; Björklund and Jäntti 1997; cf. Harding 
et al. 2005; Morgan, Fields, and Grusky 2006).  
In what follows, we argue that these two conventional characterizations of reproduction (i.e., class-
based, gradational) fail to capture some of the important rigidities in the mobility regime and under-
state, as a result, just how rigid contemporary mobility regimes in fact are. This argument is best de-
veloped by first reviewing the two existing approaches to characterizing mobility regimes and turning 
thereafter to a review of our occupational approach. Throughout this review, we will often refer to 
occupations as “micro classes,” as they embody mechanisms (e.g., closure) and traits (e.g., culture) 
that are often attributed to big classes.  
 Gradational regime: The gradational approach to studying mobility has inequality taking on a 
simple unidimensional form in which families are arrayed in terms of either income (as economists 
would have it) or occupational status (as sociologists would have it). The life chances of children 
growing up within such systems are a function, then, of their standing within this unidimensional queue 
of families. When children are born high in the queue, they tend to secure high-status and highly re-
warded occupations by virtue of (a) their privileged access to the economic resources (e.g., wealth, 
income) needed to either purchase training for the best occupations (e.g., an elite education) or to 
“purchase” the jobs themselves (e.g., a proprietorship), (b) their privileged access to social networks 
providing information about and entree to the best occupations, and (c) their privileged access to cul-
tural resources (e.g., socialization) that motivate them to acquire the best jobs and that provide them 
with the cognitive and interactional skills (e.g., culture of critical discourse) to succeed in them. Under 
the gradational model, it is the total amount of resources that matter, and children born into privileged 
circumstances are privileged because they have access to so many resources (e.g., Hout and Hauser 
1992). The imagery here is accordingly that of two unidimensional hierarchies, one for each genera-
tion, smoothly joined together through the mediating mechanism of total resources (economic, social, 
or cultural). In Figure 1a, an ideal-typical gradational regime is represented by projecting a detailed 
cross-classification of occupational origins and destinations onto a third dimension, one which repre-
sents the densities of mobility and immobility. This graph, which orders origin and destination occupa-
tions by socioeconomic score, shows the characteristic falloff in mobility chances as the distance 
between origin and destination scores increases.2 
                                                     
2 We have added random noise to the densities of mobility and immobility in Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c. 
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Big-class regime: The big-class regime, by contrast, has inequality taking the form of mutu-
ally exclusive and exhaustive classes. These classes are often assumed to convey a package of con-
ditions (e.g., working conditions, rewards), a resulting social environment that structures behavior and 
decision-making, and a culture that may be understood as an adaptation (or maladaptation) to this 
environment. For our purposes, the relevant feature of this formulation is that all children born into the 
same class will have largely the same mobility chances, even though their parents may hold different 
occupations with different working conditions and socioeconomic standing. The logic of the class 
situation is assumed, then, to be overriding and to determine the life chances of the children born into 
it. Obversely, two big classes of similar status will not necessarily convey to their incumbents identical 
mobility chances, as they may differ on various non-status dimensions that have implications for mo-
bility. For example, proprietors and routine nonmanuals are roughly similar in socioeconomic status, 
yet the children of proprietors will tend to become proprietors and the children of routine nonmanuals 
will tend to become routine nonmanuals. This pattern arises because tastes and aspirations develop in 
class-specific ways (e.g, the children of proprietors develop tastes for autonomy and the children of 
routine nonmanuals develop tastes for stability), because human capital is cultivated and developed in 
class-specific ways (e.g., the children of proprietors develop entrepreneurial skills and the children of 
routine nonmanuals develop bureaucratic skills), and because social capital is distributed in class-
specific ways (e.g., the children of proprietors are apprised of entrepreneurial opportunities and the 
children of routine nonmanuals are apprised of routine nonmanual opportunities). By virtue of these 
processes, children do not have generic access to all occupations of comparable standing (as grada-
tionalists would have it), but instead are especially well positioned to assume occupations that align 
with the culture, training, and contacts that their class origins entail. In Figure 1b, we represent an 
Figure 1A. Gradational Regime 
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ideal-typical class regime of this sort, albeit with the (gross) simplification that inter-class densities of 
exchange are fixed to be the same. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Micro-class regime: The main question posed in this paper is whether the class form, as 
rendered above, has been operationalized in a way that fully captures the rigidities in the mobility re-
gime. The micro-class approach shares with the big-class model the presumption that contemporary 
labor markets are balkanized into discrete categories, but such balkanization is assumed to take prin-
cipally the form of institutionalized occupations (e.g., doctor, plumber, postal clerk) rather than institu-
tionalized big classes (e.g., routine nonmanuals). By implication, occupations comprising big classes 
will have differing propensities for mobility and immobility, a heterogeneity that obtains because the 
distinctive occupational worlds into which children are born have consequences for the aspirations 
they develop, the skills that they value and to which they have access, and the networks upon which 
they can draw. The children of carpenters, for example, may be especially likely to become carpenters 
because they are exposed to carpentry skills at home, are socialized in ways that render them espe-
cially appreciative of carpentry as a vocation, and are embedded in social networks that provide them 
with information about how to become carpenters and how to secure jobs in carpentry. Although a 
micro-class regime again assumes a very lumpy class form, the lumpiness is much finer, then, than 
big-class analysts would allow (see Figure 1c). Additionally, one would anticipate all manner of spe-
cialized off-diagonal affinities (DiPrete and McManus, 1993), but we have suppressed such affinities in 
Figure 1c. 
Figure 1B. Big-Class Regime 
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In past mobility research, there has been considerable debate about which of the first two forms (i.e., 
gradational, big-class) best represents the structure of contemporary mobility regimes, an older debate 
that we will not review here (see Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992b, 1993; Hout and Hauser 1992; Søren-
sen 1992). Rather, we incorporate both of these mechanisms in our models, thus allowing us to ask 
whether they exhaust the structure of mobility or must instead be supplemented with a new micro-
class mechanism. We apply this approach to test for two possible misrepresentations of the structure 
of mobility: (a) the mobility regime may appear to be more fluid than it truly is because the potentially 
extreme closure at the detailed occupational level is simply ignored (i.e., overestimated fluidity), and 
(b) the inequalities that are found in conventional analyses may be taken as evidence of class repro-
duction when in fact occupational reproduction is the underlying process (i.e., misrepresented form). 
The latter misunderstanding is of course the source of the former; that is, because conventional repre-
sentations of the reproductive process have us looking for rigidities in the wrong place, we can fail to 
find much rigidity and come to represent the mobility regime as more fluid than it truly is. We will be 
exploring the data for evidence of either of these two types of misrepresentations. 
It is unlikely that any one of these ideal-typical mechanisms has ever been realized in pure form. 
However, our strategy is to analyze countries that, at least by reputation, draw on these different 
mechanisms to varying degrees. Germany and the United States might be understood as the home 
ground of occupationalization, Sweden has a long tradition of big-class organization, while Japan is 
typically assumed to be stratified more by family and firm than by big class or occupation. We seek to 
explore in this fashion the reach of micro-class mechanisms into labor markets that have not histori-
cally been regarded as taking a micro-class form. If a micro-class mechanism nonetheless emerges 
as fundamental in these labor markets, the case for building that mechanism more systematically into 
our models is thereby strengthened. 
Figure 1C. Micro-Class Regime 
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The main intellectual backdrop to our analysis is the ongoing sociological debate about the types of 
social groupings that have taken hold in contemporary industrialism. Throughout much of the 20th 
century, sociologists were fascinated, arguably obsessed, with theorizing about the conditions under 
which big classes might form, an understandable fascination insofar as individual life chances and 
even collective outcomes (e.g., revolutions) were taken to depend on class processes. The occupa-
tionalization of the labor market has, by contrast, been treated as a mere surface phenomenon that is 
neither complicated, subtle, or consequential enough to merit much attention. With the exception of 
Durkheim (e.g., [1893] 1933) and a few intrepid neo-Durkheimians (e.g., Bourdieu 1984), scant atten-
tion has therefore been paid to the occupational balkanization of contemporary labor markets, how-
ever profound this process appears to be. To be sure, occupations have long been represented in 
sociological rhetoric as the “backbone” of the inequality system (e.g., Parkin 1971), yet the tendency 
has been to reduce occupations to gradational scores (e.g., Hauser and Warren 1997; Ganzeboom et 
al. 1992) or to use them as aggregates in constructing big classes (e.g., Erikson and Goldthorpe 
1992a). These conventional approaches do of course bring in the occupational dimension indirectly. 
We argue, however, for explicitly bringing it out by treating detailed occupations as real, discrete 
groups that shape experiences in the family of origin and that are often envisaged as future labor mar-
ket positions. We will explore the hypothesis that, because detailed occupations are often deeply 
institutionalized, a host of mechanisms come into play that bring about occupation-specific intergen-
erational reproduction (Grusky 2005). 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss the mechanisms underlying int-
ergenerational reproduction, distinguishing in particular between the mechanisms making for micro-
class reproduction and those making for big-class reproduction. We next discuss how these mecha-
nisms play out in our four countries and produce different combinations of micro-class and big-class 
reproduction. The resulting hypotheses about the structure of cross-national variation in mobility are 
then tested by applying log-linear models to highly disaggregate father-to-son and father-to-daughter 
mobility tables. We conclude with a discussion of the results and their bearing on the debate between 
micro-class and big-class proponents. 
The reproduction of micro-classes 
We turn now to a discussion of the mechanisms that underlie the reproduction of micro-classes. Fol-
lowing Table 1, we will first review the mechanisms that may generate big-class reproduction, as doing 
so sets the stage for examining whether similar mechanisms are also activated on behalf of micro-
class reproduction. Although we will not be directly measuring these mechanisms, it is revealing 
nonetheless to clarify how reproduction is likely to be achieved at the micro-class and big-class levels.  
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Table 1: Mechanisms of intergenerational reproduction 
 Type of Reproduction 
Type of resources  
Big-class 
 
Micro-class 
 
Human capital General or abstract skills (e.g., cognitive or verbal abilities) 
Occupation-specific skills (e.g., 
acting skills, carpentry skills) 
 
Cultural capital Abstract culture and tastes (e.g., “culture of critical discourse”) 
Occupation-specific culture and 
tastes (e.g., aspirations to become a 
medical doctor) 
 
Social networks Classwide networks (typically developed through neighborhood 
or job-related interactions) 
Occupation-specific networks 
(typically developed through on-the-
job interactions) 
 
Economic resources Liquid resources (e.g., stocks, bonds, income) 
Fixed resources (e.g., business, 
farm) 
 
For the purposes of this discussion, we will treat professionals as an illustrative big class (e.g., Gould-
ner 1979; Bell 1973), and we will ask why the children of professionals may be especially likely to 
become professionals themselves. It is not enough in addressing this question to simply make refer-
ence to the general resources available to professional children (e.g., money, prestige) and to the 
generic advantages that these resources convey in the competition for all high-status positions. We 
must additionally ask why professional children are more likely to assume professional positions than 
non-professional positions of equivalent standing. The objective, in other words, is to explain why 
reproduction takes on a pure class form that cannot be explained in simple gradational terms. To be 
sure, some class analysts prefer an encompassing definition of class reproduction, one that would 
label both gradational and “pure” class reproduction as different types of a more broadly understood 
form of class reproduction. We are not averse to this broad definition of class reproduction, but it is 
useful even in the context of such a definition to distinguish between two types of class reproduction, a 
pure or “class-specific” form involving mechanisms that bring about a direct correspondence between 
origin and destination class, and a gradational or “general” form involving mechanisms that locate 
children in destinations that are socioeconomically close to their origin class (but not in the origin class 
itself).3  
If we focus on the sources of pure class reproduction and consider professional reproduction as an 
illustrative case, a natural starting point is the standard argument that professional families transmit 
specialized cognitive abilities that pay off principally in the professional class. The ability, for example, 
to write effectively is useful in many professional occupations and will presumably be inculcated in 
                                                     
3 It is equally important to distinguish between occupational and gradational effects. That is, just as incumbents of 
big classes may either remain in their class of origin or move to a “close” class, so too incumbents of detailed 
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professional children because their parents stress the importance of reading, frequently discuss 
newspapers and written texts at home, and may even provide hands-on instruction in writing. This 
transmission of cognitive skills is of course carried out in the context of a wider class-specific culture 
that likewise prepares children for professional destinations (see Erikson and Jonsson 1996). The 
culture of “critical discourse” (Gouldner 1979; Bell 1973), which may be understood as the reigning 
culture of the professional class, is transmitted to professional children because their parents practice 
and reward abstract argumentation, justify claims on the basis of argument rather than authority, and 
openly discuss all topics no matter how sacred, obvious, or illicit others might deem them. It is surely 
plausible that children exposed to and trained in such critical discourse will be well-suited for occupa-
tions that rely on it in their everyday business. More generally, children are exposed to various types 
of class-specific capital that leads them to develop class-specific personalities or proclivities, with such 
personalities or proclivities then proving attractive to employers hiring within that class (Jackson 2006; 
Barrick and Mount 1991).4  
The children growing up in professional families are also exposed to professional networks that may 
have a similar reproductive effect. Because professional children come into frequent contact with other 
professional families, they will (a) learn about the world of professions and come to be oriented toward 
that world, (b) develop knowledge about how to prepare for professional occupations, and (c) have a 
ready supply of contacts who can assist them as they begin their careers (e.g., provide internships, 
inform them of jobs). These social advantages can be exploited by professional children because they 
have the economic resources that make it easier to secure professional credentials (e.g., medical 
degree, law degree, Ph.D.). As indicated in Table 1, a purely economic mechanism doesn’t tell us why 
professional children might aspire to become professionals, but it does speak to why, once such aspi-
rations are in place, they are especially likely to be realized. 
The foregoing accounts emphasize, then, the transmission of abstract resources that putatively have 
payoff across all professional occupations. We have referred to generic skills that pertain to all profes-
sional occupations (e.g., writing skills), to a generic culture that characterizes all professional occupa-
tions (e.g., a culture of “critical discourse”), and to a broad professional network that cuts across all the 
occupations comprising the professional class. Although classwide transmission processes of this sort 
undoubtedly play out, it is unclear how strong they are and whether they exhaust all forms of class 
reproduction. Are we underestimating the extent of rigidity in the mobility regime by simply assuming, 
without any substantiating evidence, that all reproduction is of this classwide variety? We outline 
below the various mechanisms through which skills, culture, networks, and economic resources are 
passed on in ways that facilitate not just class reproduction but occupation reproduction as well. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
occupations may either remain in their occupation of origin or move to a “close” occupation. We will fit models 
that distinguish these two types of effects at both the big-class and micro-class levels. 
4 The professional personality, for example, features intellectual prowess and command over arcane forms of 
human capital (e.g., emphasis on abstract argumentation), whereas the managerial personality rests rather 
more on social prowess of various kinds (e.g., being outgoing, extroverted, interpersonally smooth). 
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Occupation-specific human capital 
We begin by asking whether occupation-specific human capital is reliably transmitted from parent to 
child. Although the historic separation of home and workplace has made it more difficult for parents to 
transmit occupational human capital, it obviously does not follow that such capital is no longer trans-
mitted at all. The sociologist, for example, may well talk shop with her or his children at the dinner 
table, litter the home with books, magazines, and newspapers that betray a sociological orientation, 
and in all other ways inculcate a sociological perspective in the natural course of everyday childrear-
ing. The engineer, by contrast, may bring home toys that involve building things, may focus conversa-
tion and inquiry on the world of things, and may impart a special interest in understanding “how things 
work.” In the aftermath of the World Trade Center collapse, we can imagine the engineer’s family 
talking mainly about why the building failed structurally, while the sociologist’s family talks mainly 
about why there is terrorism.  
The transmission of occupation-specific human capital is likely to occur outside the professional sector 
as well. The mechanic is especially likely to spend time at home engaging in repairs, may take her or 
his children into the repair shop, and may otherwise encourage an interest in taking things apart and 
fixing them (i.e., a “practical” engineer). Likewise, the seamstress may talk frequently about fashion at 
home, may take her or his children to fashion shows, and may train them in sewing and designing 
clothes. These examples make the simple point that the occupational commitments of parents can 
affect what they discuss at home, how they spend time with their children, and hence the skills that 
they impart to their children.  
Occupation-specific cultural capital 
The second assumption of conventional big-class analysis is that cultural reproduction is also an ab-
stract process that plays out principally at the classwide level. By “cultural reproduction,” we are refer-
ring to the tendency of parents to transmit tastes, values, and orientations that make their children 
want to hold the same class or occupation as their parents (i.e., the supply-side effect) and that make 
their children more attractive to potential employees within those classes or occupations (i.e., the de-
mand-side effect). The key question for our purposes is whether parents pass on not just abstract 
classwide cultures that lead to big-class reproduction but also more concrete occupation-specific 
cultures that lead to micro-class reproduction.  
This question cannot be well answered without some understanding of the conditions under which 
cultures form and are maintained. The two-pronged foundation of all cultures is (a) a training regimen 
that inculcates a set of values and way of life (i.e., the training condition), and (b) some type of closure 
mechanism that ensures that class or occupation members interact principally with one another and 
thus protects against extraneous influences that could undermine the shared values into which mem-
bers have been trained (i.e., the closure condition). These two conditions are, we shall argue, met 
more reliably within detailed occupations than big classes. For example, lawyers undergo intensive 
training within law school (i.e., the training condition) and interact frequently with one another in a rela-
tively closed workplace (i.e., the closure condition), thus creating and sustaining an occupational cul-
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ture that, in this case, rests on a celebration of rhetoric, argumentation, and instrumental action. As 
Grusky (2005) stresses, not all occupations have well-developed training regimens and dense intra-
occupational networks of this sort, but those that do will develop an “esprit de corps” that can then be 
passed on to children and contribute to micro-reproduction (e.g., Van Maanan and Barley 1984; 
Hughes 1958; Caplow 1954). 
These occupational cultures will affect not only the skills that are developed and that employers select 
on (i.e., the demand-side effect) but also the tastes and preferences that underlie aspirations (i.e., the 
supply-side effect). As Goldthorpe (1987, p. 99) put it, one might expect “particularistic variations” in 
the perceived desirability of different positions, variations that stem in part from culturally-specific 
judgments about what types of tasks are honorable, desirable, or valuable. These particularistic varia-
tions can operate to make typically attractive occupations yet more attractive or typically repellant 
occupations less repellant. For example, the offspring of parents in undesirable occupations (e.g., 
morticians, plumbers, garbage collectors) may “overvalue” these positions because their parents, per-
haps in part through dissonance reduction processes, tend to talk up the virtues of their occupations or 
to stress advantages that others may overlook.5 Because children cathect to parents, they of course 
tend to value and embrace what their parents value and embrace, thus leading to the intergenerational 
reproduction of aspirations. We are suggesting here that such reproduction takes on principally a 
micro-class form: When a daughter cathects to her nursing mother, it leads to a commitment, for ex-
ample, to become a “nurse like mom,” not necessarily a commitment to become a “middle-class 
worker like mom.” 
Other occupation-specific mechanisms 
The two remaining mechanisms in Table 1, networks and economic resources, operate in uncompli-
cated ways. For example, parents can clearly draw on both micro-class and big-class networks, the 
former arising because the workplace is often occupationally structured (e.g., the “law firm”), and the 
latter arising because the workplace also privileges some types of classwide interactions (e.g., attor-
neys interacting with paralegals) and because residential segregation typically takes on a classwide 
rather than occupational form (e.g., attorneys living in the same neighborhood as doctors). These 
class networks, both in their big-class and micro-class forms, affect the reproduction process by ex-
posing children to particular types of positions and by giving them access to contacts who can assist 
them in securing those positions. 
As for economic resources, the main point to be made is that liquid economic resources can be har-
nessed for the purpose of big-class reproduction, an obvious example being the financing of law 
school training by a parent who is a medical doctor (and hence has the requisite liquid resources). It is 
of course possible that such liquid resources will also be harnessed for the purpose of micro-class 
                                                     
5 Similarly, children have to explain to themselves why their parents remain in seemingly undesirable 
occupations, an analogous form of dissonance reduction that plays out among children rather than their 
parents. These processes may induce parents and children to make reference to little-known features of the 
occupations that render them more desirable than others appreciate. 
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reproduction: The same doctor might use her or his wealth to finance a child’s medical school training 
rather than law school training. Although liquid resources can therefore be used to further big-class, 
micro-class, or gradational reproduction, fixed resources often come in occupation-specific form (e.g., 
the family dentistry practice) and will therefore further occupation-specific reproduction alone. The 
dentist with a dentistry practice could cash in that practice and convert it to liquid form, but such 
“cashing in” would entail all manner of transaction costs (e.g., sales commission, loss of particularistic 
customer information) that would be avoided by a direct inheritance. These transaction costs create an 
incentive, then, for the dentist’s child to take her or his inheritance in fixed form, thus resulting in 
micro-class reproduction.  
This review suggests that many of the mechanisms underlying intergenerational reproduction should 
generate rigidities at a more detailed level than has typically been appreciated. At minimum, our 
review calls into question the conventional assumption that all reproduction occurs at the big-class 
level, an assumption that underlies the construction of mobility tables that cross-classify big-class 
origins and destinations. We treat this long-standing assumption as a hypothesis and examine 
whether it is consistent with the data.  
Cross-national differences in reproduction 
For didactic purposes, we have presented our argument for a micro-class approach in general and 
universal terms, but it likely holds to a greater extent in some countries than in others. The usefulness 
of a micro-class approach in any given country will depend on whether the labor market encourages 
parents to accumulate occupation-specific or classwide capital (human, cultural, social) and whether, 
in light of the type of capital accumulated, parents are motivated to identify with their occupation or 
their big class. We expect micro-class reproduction to be strongest in countries in which parents 
accumulate much occupation-specific capital, identify with their occupation, and accordingly “bring 
home” their occupation in ways that then make it salient to their children and lead them to invest in it. 
Likewise, micro-class reproduction will be strengthened insofar as employers can (a) directly discrimi-
nate on behalf of individuals with the requisite occupational background (i.e., “direct micro-class dis-
crimination”), or (b) indirectly privilege such individuals by setting up recruitment protocols that covertly 
select for attributes that family-trained workers are more likely to embody (i.e., “indirect micro-class 
discrimination”). The same supply-side and demand-side forces could of course equally operate at the 
big-class level and thereby produce big-class reproduction.  
As shown in Table 2, big-class and micro-class structuration may be viewed as analytically independ-
ent of one another, thus generating four ideal-typical mobility regimes. In a recent paper on class for-
mation, Grusky (2005) suggests that Germany, United States, Sweden, and Japan come closest to 
approximating these four ideal types, and our point of departure in this paper is therefore precisely 
those countries. We review below how class formation is conventionally represented in  
 
Arbei tspapiere -  Mannheimer  Zentrum für  Europäische Sozia l forschung  100  
 - 12 -
Table 2. Countries classified by type and amount of class structure 
 Micro-class structure 
Big-class Structure High Low 
High  Germany (Vocational training 
& big-class trade unions) 
Sweden (Big-class collective 
bargaining) 
Low U.S. (Craft unions & occupa-
tional associations) 
Japan (Firm identification & 
generalized education) 
 
Germany, United States, Sweden, and Japan and how, based on such representations, one might 
expect their mobility regime to take on a big-class or micro-class form.  
The case of Germany provides an example of a society that is stratified at once in occupational and 
big-class terms. Because Germany has a well-developed system of vocational training, parents accu-
mulate considerable occupation-specific skills and will typically view their occupations as important 
identities, and the family accordingly becomes a site in which such skills or commitments can be con-
veyed and in which aspirations for occupational reproduction can emerge (e.g., Müller and Gangl 
2003; Burkhauser, Holtz-Eakin, and Rhody 1998; DiPrete et al. 1997; DiPrete and McManus 1996; 
Blossfeld and Mayer 1988; Shavit and Müller 1998). At the same time, Germany is also the home 
ground of big-class structuration, as expressed particularly in the difference in employment regulations 
for wage earners, employees (Angestellte), and civil servants (Beamte) and the importance of big-
class trade unions in collective bargaining and codetermination (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000; Kocka 
1981). The typical German parent will therefore embrace both a big-class and occupational identity 
and presumably transfer those commitments to their children.6 This account, standard though it is, 
does not align well with conventional practice in modeling mobility regimes. When applied to Germany, 
the conventional big-class mobility model will not only gloss over substantial within-class rigidities, but 
will also misrepresent these omitted micro-level rigidities as big-class reproduction. 
By contrast, Japan can be said to represent an entirely contrary case, one with low structuration at 
both the micro-class and big-class levels. The educational system is general rather than vocational, 
and labor market attachments are firm-specific rather than occupation-specific and hence entail much 
within-firm mobility that cuts across occupational lines (e.g., Kato 2001; Ishida 1993). For the ideal-
typical Japanese parent, there is little opportunity to develop occupational skills, and indeed the ten-
dency is to identify with the firm rather than the occupation (at least for big-firm employees). Although 
recent commentators have suggested that occupational commitments may be strengthening with the 
breakdown of the permanent employment system (e.g., Brinton 2004; Kosugi 2003), it is still conven-
tional to assume that, relative to such micro-class strongholds as Germany, Japan is distinctive for its 
weak occupational structuration. Likewise, Japanese workers are not strongly committed to their big 
                                                     
6 This vocational tradition emerges also in Holland, Denmark, and Austria. 
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class, as aggregate trade unions of the big-class variety have not emerged and collective bargaining 
at the big-class level is entirely undeveloped.  
The Swedish case may be understood as a hybrid of the German and Japanese cases. As in Japan, 
guilds in Sweden early on lost in importance, although occupational trade unions do exist in Sweden. 
Even so, industrial relations are principally a matter of negotiation between centralized trade unions 
and employer federations, and indeed even professional unions have an overarching negotiating 
association.7 The trade union for manual workers (LO) has traditionally been very closely tied to the 
Social-Democratic Party, meaning that the political influence of aggregate-level organizations has 
been substantial, amplified by the corporatist organization of the state. The Swedish case resembles, 
then, the German case in its well-developed big-class organization (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1985; Korpi 
1981), while it resembles Japan in its suppressed occupational organization. It follows that the con-
ventional big-class mobility model is tailor-made for the Swedish case. Finally, the case of the United 
States is one of moderately developed vocationalism and occupational associations, especially in the 
professional and craft sectors. Whereas the vocationalism of Germany is coupled with equally strong 
big-class organization, it has served in the United States mainly to strengthen craft unions and to 
undercut big-class unions and organization. As a result, parents in the United States will typically 
identify quite strongly with their occupation and have substantial occupational skills that may then be 
conveyed to children, whereas their commitment to big classes tends to be weak. In the context of this 
highly occupationalized labor market, the conventional big-class mobility model has to be understood 
as quite problematic, as it glosses over substantial intra-class rigidities and misrepresents the rigidities 
that it does capture as exclusively big-class in form. Given such problems, it is hardly surprising that 
some of the main critics of big-class mobility models are from the United States (e.g., Weeden and 
Grusky 2005; Grusky and Sørensen 2001) or from countries, such as Canada (e.g., Rytina 2000) or 
Australia (e.g., Pakulski 2005), that have U.S.-style mobility regimes. 
This is all to suggest that countries may differ not merely in the amount of mobility but also in its form. 
We proceed, then, by developing a new and more encompassing mobility model that allows all forms 
of rigidity to surface and that can capture possible inter-country differences in the underlying shape of 
mobility. If some scholars have emphasized cross-national similarities in the mobility regime (e.g., 
Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; but see Breen 2004), it is perhaps because their analyses have been 
carried out with a big-class model that conceals any differences that fall outside the big-class form. 
This possibility is explored in much detail below. 
                                                     
7 The history of Swedish trade unions is distinctive in five ways. First, manual workers created an overarching 
organization in the late 19th century (LO), and only after that were occupational unions formed. Second, all 
manual laborers in a given production unit are traditionally organized by the numerically dominant occupational 
trade union, thereby avoiding a division of manual laborers and increasing the negotiating strength of the local 
trade union. Third, LO has had a strong ideological commitment to equalized wages within the working class, 
leading to very small differences in material circumstances and life-chances between skilled and unskilled 
workers, particularly in comparison to Germany (e.g., Shavit and Müller 1998). Fourth, professionals have 
formed an overarching organization (SACO) that represents them at central negotiations, as have clerks and 
lower-level white-collar workers (TCO). Fifth, the proportion of employees associated with a trade union is very 
high (compared to what prevails in other countries), both among manual and non-manual workers. 
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Data, variables, and class schemes  
The analyses presented here will be carried out with data from four countries (United States, Sweden, 
Germany, and Japan) that provide information on the father’s occupation, the child’s occupation, sex, 
age, and other variables that aid in occupational and big-class coding (e.g., employment status, 
branch of industry). Because our analyses are pitched at the occupational level, our father-by-respon-
dent mobility tables will have many cells, and large data sets for each country are needed. We meet 
this requirement by drawing on multiple surveys in all countries save Sweden. For Sweden, the 
respondent’s data come from the 1990 Census (FoB), and the parent’s occupations are then recov-
ered by linking to the 1960 and 1970 Censuses (Erikson and Jonsson 1993). The data from the 
remaining countries come from the sources listed in Table A1. 
We carry out our cross-national analyses with data that are as comparable as possible. Given our 
need for large data sets, some compromises nonetheless had to be made, most notably pertaining to 
the period covered and the age of the respondents. The data from the United States, for example, are 
drawn disproportionately from earlier time periods, although more recent data from the United States 
are used as well (see Table A1 for details). Additionally, the Swedish data set only covers respondents 
between 30 and 47 years old, whereas all other data sets cover respondents between 30 and 64 
years old. We correct for these incomparabilities to the extent possible by fitting models that control for 
period and age. 
We next proceeded by constructing a detailed occupational coding scheme that may be faithfully 
applied to all four countries (see Table 3 and Table A2).8 This scheme, which includes 82 occupations, 
captures many of the fundamental boundaries in the division of labor that are socially recognized and 
defended (see Sørensen and Grusky 1996 for a closely related scheme). In constructing the scheme, 
we sought to ensure that the jobs constituting each occupational category were comparable across 
countries, but inevitably some compromises had to be made because the source classification 
schemes were not detailed enough or because of real cross-national differences in how the division of 
labor is constructed.9 The Japanese classification was quite idiosyncratic and sometimes difficult to 
reconcile with the others, but for the most part the same detailed occupations could be identified even 
in Japan.10 This isomorphism, to the extent that it held, may be traced to three sources: (a) each coun 
try independently settled on the same way of dividing labor and defining occupations (perhaps owing 
to the “efficiency” of that shared solution); (b) a particular solution to the division of labor diffused 
across countries; or (c) a shared classification scheme diffused among statisticians, sociologists, and 
 
                                                     
8 The occupations are ordered within each meso-level class according to their socioeconomic score (ISEI) in the 
United States (see Ganzeboom, de Graaf, and Treiman [1992] for information on the ISEI). 
9 In most cases, our “occupations” were created by aggregating several detailed occupations into a single 
category, thus making the label “micro-class” more apt than “occupation.” We nonetheless use these terms 
interchangeably here. 
10 We soon provide detailed documentation of our occupation classification decisions at 
http://www.classmobility.org. 
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Table 3. Micro-classes nested in manual-nonmanual classes, macro classes, and meso classes 
NONMANUAL CLASS  MANUAL CLASS 
I. Professional-
managerial 
II. Proprie-
tors 
III. Routine 
nonman.  IV. Manual V. Primary 
 
A. Classical 
professions 
1. Jurists 
2. Health professionals 
3. Professors and 
instructors 
4. Natural scientists 
5. Statistical and social 
scientists 
6. Architects 
7. Accountants 
8. Authors and 
journalists 
9. Engineers 
B. Managers and 
officials  
1. Officials, govt. and 
non-profit orgs. 
2. Other managers 
3. Commercial 
managers 
4. Building managers 
and proprietors 
C. Other professions 
1. Systems analysts and 
programmers 
2. Aircraft pilots and 
navigators 
3. Personnel and labor 
relations workers 
4. Elementary and 
secondary teachers 
5. Librarians 
6. Creative artists 
7. Ship officers 
8. Professional and 
technical, n.e.c. 
9. Social and welfare 
workers 
10. Workers in religion 
11. Nonmedical 
technicians 
12. Health 
semiprofessionals 
13. Hospital attendants 
14. Nursery school 
teachers and aides 
 
1. Proprietors 
 
A. Sales 
1. Real estate 
agents 
2. Agents, n.e.c. 
3. Insurance 
agents 
4. Cashiers 
5. Sales workers 
B. Clerical 
1. Telephone 
operators 
2. Bookkeepers 
3. Office workers 
4. Postal clerks 
 
A. Craft 
1. Craftsmen , n.e.c. 
2. Foremen 
3. Electronics service and 
repair 
4. Printers and related 
workers 
5. Locomotive operators 
6. Electricians 
7. Tailors and related workers 
8. Vehicle mechanics 
9. Blacksmiths and machinists 
10. Jewelers 
11. Other mechanics 
12. Plumbers and pipe-fitters 
13. Cabinetmakers 
14. Bakers 
15. Welders 
16. Painters 
17. Butchers 
18. Stationary engine operators 
19. Bricklayers and carpenters 
20. Heavy machine operators 
B. Lower manual 
1. Truck drivers 
2. Chemical processors 
3. Miners and related workers 
4. Longshoremen  
5. Food processing workers 
6. Textile workers 
7. Sawyers 
8. Metal processors 
9. Operatives and kindred, 
n.e.c. 
10. Forestry workers 
C. Service workers 
1. Protective service workers 
2. Transport conductors 
3. Guards and watchmen 
4. Food service workers 
5. Mass transportation 
operators 
6. Service workers, n.e.c. 
7. Hairdressers 
8. Newsboys and deliverymen 
9. Launderers 
10. Housekeeping workers 
11. Janitors and cleaners 
12. Gardeners 
1. Fishermen 
2. Farmers 
3. Farm laborers 
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other classifiers even though it mapped only imperfectly onto the actual division of labor.11 Although 
the latter, artifactual source of cross-national similarity is no doubt partly at work, there is clearly a real 
isomorphism in the division of labor producing many occupations that are deeply institutionalized (e.g., 
architect, electrician, miner). For such categories, the residual inconsistencies in coding appear to be 
quite small, and such cross-national differences as emerge in our data almost certainly signal real 
rather than artifactual variability. 
The careful reader will have noticed that our occupational scheme does not distinguish self-employed 
and employed workers (see Table 3). To be sure, we have coded storekeepers as “proprietors” and 
distinguished farmers from farm laborers, but otherwise the occupational affiliation takes precedence 
and employed and self-employed workers are combined in a single category. This raises the possibil-
ity that, for occupations with substantial self-employment, high rates of inheritance may be generated 
not because the occupation has unusual holding power but because of the well-known holding power 
of self-employment itself (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992a). We will correct for the potentially con-
founding effects of self-employment by completing separate mobility analyses for respondents with 
and without self-employed fathers.12 
The distinctive feature of our analysis is that micro-class effects are layered over more conventional 
big-class effects. Given our suspicion that big-class effects may be weak, it is clearly important to 
adopt a big-class scheme that fully captures such big-class effects, as otherwise any possible shortfall 
in big-class explanatory power might be attributed to a poor operationalization. We have accordingly 
proceeded by fitting a multiplicity of nested big-class contrasts that capture the many and varied big-
class distinctions that scholars have identified. As shown in Table 3, we begin by distinguishing the 
manual and nonmanual classes, a big-class distinction so important that early class scholars often 
focused on it alone. We next identify three “macro classes” in the nonmanual category (i.e., profes-
sional-managerial, proprietor, routine nonmanual) and another two macro classes in the manual cate-
gory (i.e., manual, primary). Within three of these macro classes, we then allow further “meso class” 
distinctions to emerge: the professional-managerial class is divided into classical professions, manag-
ers and officials, and other professions; the routine nonmanual class is divided into sales workers and 
clerks; and the manual class is divided into craft, lower manual, and service workers. The resulting 
scheme, which embodies three layers of big-class distinctions (i.e., manual-nonmanual, macro class, 
and meso class), may be understood as a non-denominational hybrid of conventional schemes that 
assembles in one scheme many of the contrasts that have historically been emphasized by big-class 
scholars. 
                                                     
11 The national occupational classification schemes differed across the early and late surveys used in the United 
States, Germany, and Japan (see Table A1). 
12 It is very much a European tradition to distinguish the propertied classes. In the United States, private property 
hardly appears to be without consequence, but even so the self-employed are commonly merged with other 
“middle-class” occupations. When the self-employed are singled out in U.S. mobility studies, the resulting 
pattern is one of quite strong inheritance, just as in Europe (e.g., Hout 1984; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1985). 
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These distinctions will be introduced in our mobility model as a nested set of contrasts (see Herting et 
al. 1997; Stier and Grusky 1990). This approach not only allows us to tease out the net residue of 
reproduction at the meso-class, macro-class, and manual-nonmanual levels but also allows for 
patterns of exchange that are more complicated than those conventionally allowed. The stylized 
father-to-child mobility table in Figure 2 depicts these three sets of overlapping big-class parameters  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Overlapping inheritance terms in mobility model 
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and shows how they capture quite complicated affinities. If we had instead proceeded by fitting meso-
class effects alone (as is conventional), we could absorb excess densities in the dark-gray regions of 
Figure 2 but not the surrounding light-gray regions. This simple extension of conventional mobility 
models thus opens up room for a powerful big-class account of intergenerational mobility.  
In evaluating our big-class scheme, our main point of vulnerability is that, as a “non-denominational” 
scheme, it does not align perfectly with any standard class scheme on offer (e.g., Erikson and Gold-
thorpe 1992a; Wright 2005). To be sure, the scheme does exploit effectively the shared information 
available in each of the 10 data sets analyzed here (see Table A1), but it may discomfit purists who 
believe that their preferred big-class scheme best represents the true structure of mobility chances. 
The available evidence on this point, although limited, is nonetheless reassuring. Because the data 
sets from Sweden and Germany may be readily coded into the standard Erikson-Goldthorpe (EG) big-
class scheme, we went forward and carried out those codings (for father’s class) and then compared 
the explanatory power of the EG and non-denominational scheme for such dependent variables as 
income (for sons and daughters) and occupational prestige (for sons and daughters). The variances 
explained were quite similar across the two schemes and thus supported the claim that our non-
denominational classification can well represent big-class effects (see Weeden and Grusky 2005 for 
similar results).13 
We should note, finally, that most of our analyses in this paper pertain to men. As is frequently 
emphasized, women’s mobility is complicated to model and represent because, even more so than for 
men, the process of intergenerational transmission operates through both parents. We nonetheless 
present here selected results on women’s mobility that set the stage for a more comprehensive analy-
sis we are currently conducting. 
Absolute mobility 
As a precursor to modeling the association between origins and destinations, we report gross immo-
bility rates at four levels of aggregation, each presented separately for our four countries. The statis-
tics presented in Table 4 pertain to the percentage of total observations that fall on the main diagonal 
of (a) a 2×2 manual-nonmanual table, (b) a 5×5 macro-class table, (c) a 10×10 meso-class table, and 
(d) an 82×82 micro-class table. 
 
                                                     
13 In the Swedish data, the EG scheme outperforms our nondenominational scheme, both for income and 
occupational prestige. The two schemes perform almost identically in Germany (although here only prestige 
outcomes were available). We also sought to validate the nondenominational scheme by regressing income on 
respondent’s class. For these tests, the results in Sweden sometimes favored the EG scheme and sometimes 
favored the nondenominational scheme, whereas the results in Germany always favored the 
nondenominational scheme. 
Arbei tspapiere -  Mannheimer  Zentrum für  Europäische Sozia l forschung  100  
 - 19 -
Table 4. Percent immobile by level of aggregation (for men) 
 Country 
Level of analysis U.S. Japan Germany Sweden 
A. Big class      
    1. Manual-nonmanual 65 68 67 64 
    2. Macro class 39 41 51 49 
    3. Meso class 1 21 30 31 26 
B. Micro class 2 10 23 14 11 
1 We have defined an exhaustive meso-class scheme by treating “proprietors” and the “primary 
sector” as meso classes. 
2 We have defined an exhaustive micro-class scheme by treating “proprietors” as a micro class. 
 
We find that at the manual-nonmanual level about two-thirds of respondents in all countries are inter-
generationally stable. At the macro-class level, the expected cross-national differences emerge, with 
Germany (51 percent) and Sweden (49 percent) having substantially more inheritance than either 
Japan (41 percent) or the United States (39 percent). These cross-national differences persist in 
attenuated form at the meso-class level. At the detailed micro-class level, the overall amount of immo-
bility reduces substantially (ranging from 10 to 23 percent), and the pattern of cross-national variability 
changes as well. As expected, Germany evinces high rates of micro-class immobility, at least relative 
to what prevails in Sweden. However, micro-class immobility is surprisingly high in Japan, a result that 
cannot be entirely attributed to the large farming sector in Japan (coupled with the characteristically 
high immobility rates in that sector). In our side analyses (not reported here), we have found that even 
outside the farming sector there is much micro-class immobility in Japan, indeed substantially more 
than would be expected under the stereotypical view that occupational commitments are suppressed 
in that country. We explore the sources of this surprising result in our subsequent analyses. 
The more important point to be stressed at this point is that only a minority of respondents in any 
country (i.e., 10-23 percent) experience micro-class immobility. This result is of course potentially con-
sistent with substantial inequality of opportunity at the micro-class level. We do not know, as yet, 
whether children have privileged access to their micro-class of origin, although an immobility rate 
between 10 and 23 percent suggests extraordinary inequality of opportunity given how small micro-
classes are. The comparatively higher immobility rates at the big-class level partly arises because 
chance alone (i.e., the model of independence) will generate much big-class immobility when classes 
are so big. Moreover, conventional mobility tables suppress the distinction between big-class and 
micro-class immobility, the latter contributing to the appearance of the former. It is altogether possible, 
then, that the big-class immobility observed in conventional mobility tables is propagated by two wholly 
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artifactual sources: (a) the operation of chance clustering on the main diagonal of the sort that the 
model of independence would generate, and (b) the operation of micro-class clustering that mislead-
ingly shows up as big-class clustering in a conventional big-class table (i.e., an artifact of excessive 
aggregation). The radical hypothesis that big-class immobility is entirely an artifact of these two 
sources can only be tested by turning, as we do next, to an analysis of relative rates in which the mar-
ginals are fit and immobility at each of the four levels (i.e., manual-nonmanual, macro class, meso 
class, micro class) is teased out. This analysis of relative rates allows us to speak to the inequality of 
opportunity expressed in a mobility table (i.e., “social fluidity”). 
Relative mobility  
The model applied throughout this paper represents all three of the mobility mechanisms that we have 
discussed by including parameters for gradational exchange and for big-class and micro-class immo-
bility. This model takes the following form in each country:  
 
 
where i indexes origins, j indexes destinations, mij refers to the expected value in the ijth cell, α refers 
to the main effect, βi and γj refer to row and column marginal effects, φ refers to the socioeconomic 
effect, μi (origin) and μj (destination) are socioeconomic scale values assigned to each of the 82 micro-
classes,14 and δS, δB, δI, and δM refer to manual-nonmanual, macro-class, meso-class, and micro-
class immobility effects respectively. The latter parameters are layered on one another and therefore 
capture net effects. The manual-nonmanual parameter, for example, indexes the average density 
across those cells pertaining to manual or nonmanual inheritance after purging the additional residue 
of inheritance that may obtain at the macro-class, meso-class, and micro-class levels (see Herting et 
al. 1997). This layering of effects is portrayed graphically in Figure 2. The particular occupations that 
constitute the manual-nonmanual, macro-class, meso-class, and micro-class categories are 
represented in Table 3.  
The socioeconomic parameter, φ, captures the tendency of children to assume occupations that are 
socioeconomically close to their origins (see Hout 1988). If the apparent clustering at the micro-class, 
meso-class, macro-class, or manual-nonmanual levels reflects nothing more than this gradational 
tendency, then the inheritance parameters will become insignificant when the socioeconomic pa-
rameter is included. The big-class and micro-class parameters, taken together, thus speak to the 
                                                     
14 We have calculated the 82 micro-class scores by assigning international socioeconomic scores (Ganzeboom et 
al. 1992) to detailed occupations within the U.S. samples and then aggregating these detailed occupations up 
to the micro-class level. The resulting scores are therefore weighted by the relative size of the detailed 
occupations comprising each micro-class in the United States. Although we could have allowed cross-national 
differences in internal weights, we instead opted to use a cross-nationally consistent scale. 
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extent to which the mobility regime is lumpy rather than gradational, while the relative size of these 
parameters speaks to whether conventional big-class analyses have correctly represented the main 
type of lumpiness. We will also estimate a trimmed model that omits the gradational parameter (φ). As 
we noted above, some class analysts prefer an encompassing definition of “class reproduction,” one 
that treats both socioeconomic and pure class reproduction as different types of a more broadly 
understood form of class reproduction. We can represent this broadened definition of class reproduc-
tion by omitting the socioeconomic term. 
We begin our log-linear analysis by exploring the common features of mobility across all four coun-
tries. As shown in Table 5, we fit a model of the general type expressed in Equation 1, but now that 
model is applied to four countries and occupational supply and demand are allowed to freely vary 
across these countries (see Line A1). The resulting index of dissimilarity, 13.0, is quite large in com- 
 
Table 5. Fit statistics for men (N=251,852) 
Model L2 df Δ BIC 
A. Cross-national invariance      
1. Common social fluidity 
O*N+D*N+G+S+B+I+M  
45,822 24,799 13.0 -262,620 
2. Exclude socioeconomic effect 
O*N+D*N+S+B+I+M 
50,627 24,800 14.2 -257,827 
3. Standard big-class model (excise micro-class inher.) 
O*N+D*N+G+S+B+I 
66,737 24,880 15.7 -242,713 
B. Cross-national variability     
1. Complete variability 
O*N+D*N+G*N+S*N+B*N+I*N+M*N  
43,501 24,523 12.1 -261,508 
2. Full set of unequal shift effects 
O*N+D*N+G*N+S*N+B+BG*N+I+IG*N+M+MG*N 
45,255 24,784 12.8 -263,001 
3. Exclude socioeconomic effect 
O*N+D*N+S*N+B+BG*N+I+IG*N+M+MG*N 
50,089 24,788 14.0 -258,216 
4. Equality constraint on shift effects 
O*N+D*N+G*N+S+B+I+M+[SG+BG+IG+MG]*N 
45,494 24,793 12.9 -262,873 
Note: O=Origins, D=Destinations, N=Country, G=Socioeconomic status (SES), S=Manual-nonmanual 
inheritance; B=Macro-class inheritance, I=Meso-class inheritance, M=Micro-class inheritance, 
SG=Uniform manual-nonmanual inheritance, BG=Uniform macro-class inheritance, IG=Uniform 
meso-class inheritance, MG=Uniform micro-class inheritance 
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parison with typical values for comparable big-class mobility models. It is reassuring, however, that 
this lack of fit is generated principally by misclassification within big classes; that is, the index of dis-
similarity for Model A1 declines to 4.5 when the expected values are aggregated up to the meso-class 
level, and it declines to 1.3 when the expected values are aggregated up to the macro-class level. For 
our purposes, it is the average densities within the regions of meso-class and macro-class inheritance 
that are principally of interest, and any lack of fit across the various cells pertaining to such inheritance 
(and to inter-class mobility) is quite unproblematic, in effect nothing more than noise around the 
means of interest to us. In presenting the coefficients from Model A1, it is useful to reweigh each of the 
national samples to 10,000 cases, as doing so ensures that our pooled estimates are not unduly 
affected by large-sample countries. We have listed these reweighed estimates in Table 6 and graphed 
them in Figure 3.  
  
Figure 3. The contours of class reproduction for men 
Note: Coefficients are drawn from Model A1 of Table 5 (after standardizing sample size to 10,000 
cases in each country). CP=Classical professions; MG=Managers and officials; OP=Other pro-
fessions; PR=Proprietors; SA=Sales; CL=Clerical; CR=Craft; LM=Lower manual; SV=Service; 
PS=Primary sector. 
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Table 6. Baseline coefficients of immobility for men 
Age & period controls 3 
Coefficients Baseline model 1 
No SES 
gradient 2 Base Age Int. Period Int. 
I. Status (SES) 4 1.14  1.06 .11 .11 
II. Big class      
A. Manual-nonmanual .26 .58 .33 .01 -.11 
B. Macro class    -.02 .20 
1. Prof.-manag. .08 .45 -.12   
2. Proprietors 1.19 1.24 2.04   
3. Routine nonman. .01 -.21 -.16   
4. Manual -.09 -.24 -.26   
5. Primary 1.18 1.44 .13   
C. Meso class    -.08 -.09 
1. Classical prof. .23 .89 .36   
2. Man. & off. -.01 -.16 .29   
3. Other prof. -.03 -.23 -.04   
4. Sales .37 .39 .58   
5. Clerical .24 .23 .24   
6. Craft .06 .02 .12   
7. Lower manual .12 .18 .24   
8. Service work .12 .12 .18   
III. Micro class 5    .13 .22 
1. Classical prof. 1.44 1.54 1.00   
2. Man. & off. 1.53 1.55 .60   
3. Other prof. 1.92 2.06 1.62   
4. Sales 1.36 1.47 .84   
5. Clerical .79 .83 .24   
6. Craft 2.07 2.08 1.74   
7. Lower manual 1.92 1.94 1.66   
8. Service work 1.72 1.81 1.29   
9. Primary 2.27 2.31 1.64   
1 Model A1, Table 5 (with N=10,000 in each country) 
2 Model A2, Table 5 (with N=10,000 in each country) 
3 Base coefficients pertain to young respondents in the early period. Interaction coefficients refer to 
the effect on the base coefficients of increasing the age of the respondent and of shifting to the 
later period. Sample size is not standardized for this model.  
4 Coefficient multiplied by 1000 for convenience in presentation. 
5 Average of micro-class coefficients within meso classes 
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The most striking feature of Figure 3 is the micro-diagonal clustering that appears as a palisade pro-
tecting occupational positions from intruders. This palisade represents very substantial departures 
from equality of opportunity. For example, children born into the classical professions are 4.2 times 
more likely to remain in their micro-class of origin than to move elsewhere within their meso-class (i.e., 
e1.44 ≈ 4.2), while the corresponding coefficients for children born into managerial, craft, and service 
occupations are 4.6, 7.9, and 5.6 respectively (i.e., e1.53 ≈ 4.6; e2.07 ≈ 7.9; e1.72 ≈ 5.6). Although the inte-
rior regions of the class structure are typically represented as zones of fluidity (e.g., Featherman and 
Hauser 1978), we find here substantial micro-class reproduction throughout the class structure, even 
among the “middle classes.” It follows that conventional analyses have underestimated how rigid the 
mobility regime is and have failed to appreciate that such rigidities obtain throughout the class struc-
ture. These rigidities have been concealed because big-class analyses aggregate across occupations 
and fail, as a result, to capture the strong inter-occupational barriers. 
How do the micro-class and big-class coefficients compare? Of the 14 big-class coefficients, the two 
largest are for proprietors (e1.19≈3.3) and primary sector workers (e1.18≈3.3), but even these two are 
smaller than all but the very smallest micro-class coefficients. It also bears noting that both of these 
big classes are big classes in name only. That is, because the proprietor class comprises only shop-
keepers, it is not the characteristic big-class amalgam of many occupations; and there is accordingly 
good reason to regard proprietors as effectively a micro class. Likewise, the primary sector is not 
much of an amalgam, dominated as it is by farmers. The remaining twelve big-class effects, all of 
which pertain to true amalgams, are comparatively weak. The strongest of these effects, those for 
classical professions, sales work, clerical work, and manual-nonmanual divide, range in size from 1.3 
to 1.4 (in multiplicative form). When the status term is omitted (Model A2, Table 5), the professional-
managerial and classical profession effects become stronger, but even under this more sympathetic 
test the big-class coefficients, which now capture big-class and gradational processes, remain much 
smaller than the average micro-class coefficient (e.45 ≈ 1.6; e.89 ≈ 2.4). 
The right side of Table 6 presents coefficients from a model that purges the effects of age and period. 
As shown in Table A1, our samples are drawn from populations of different ages and time periods, 
raising the possibility that our conclusions are sensitive to the idiosyncratic combination of ages and 
periods that happens to prevail in our data. We have explored this possibility by disaggregating the 
mobility table for each country into subtables defined by age group (30-49 years vs. 50-64 years) and 
period (1962-1975 vs. 1976-2003). In some countries, one or more of the four possible mobility tables 
couldn’t be constructed, given that the available data pertained only to one of two age groups or one 
of two periods.15 We can still identify age and period effects on big-class, micro-class, and gradational 
parameters by constraining these interactions to be the same in each country. Additionally, we are 
obliged to summarize age and period effects with a single shift effect for each of the five types of mo-
bility and immobility (i.e., status, manual-nonmanual, macro class, meso class, and micro class), as 
                                                     
15 The Swedish data, for example, pertain to a single time period (1976-2003) and a single age group (30-49 
years). 
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otherwise we would be awash in more interactions than could be reliably estimated with our relatively 
sparse data. The parameter estimates under this specification, as displayed on the right side of Table 
6, reveal that age and period effects are simply too small to have much impact on our conclusions. To 
be sure, there are non-trivial age and period effects on most of the parameters, but none so strong as 
to alter our overall conclusion that micro-class rigidities are stronger than big-class rigidities. It is also 
worth noting that micro-class closure is 25 percent stronger in the later time period than the earlier 
(i.e., e.22≈1.25), whereas big-class rigidities appear to have evolved in more complicated and ambigu-
ous ways. The long-term decline in father-by-son association observed in some analyses (e.g., 
Ganzeboom, Luijkx, and Treiman 1989) may well conceal a more complicated pattern of (a) decline in 
big-class association, and (b) increase in micro-class association. 
The skeptic might at this point suggest that our micro-class estimates are large because the micro-
diagonal in our mobility tables captures the holding power of self-employment as well as the effects of 
true occupational closure. The son of a self-employed doctor, for example, may opt to inherit his 
father’s practice not because of some special skill or interest in doctoring but simply because the 
practice itself is so valuable (and illiquid) that it would be foolhardy to opt for something else. This 
hypothesis is most straightforwardly addressed by reestimating the same mobility models after re-
stricting the samples in each country to employed fathers. As shown in Figure A1, the micro-class 
coefficients for Model A1 (Table 5) remain much the same for employed fathers, implying that a pure 
occupational effect is indeed at work and accounts for most of the clustering on the micro-diagonal. 
Although some occupations, especially those in sales and crafts, evince less clustering under this 
restriction, the main conclusion is that micro-class inheritance remains a formidable force even when 
there is no physical capital to be transferred. 
Is big-class reproduction a myth? 
The foregoing results raise the possibility that the big-class inheritance showing up in generations of 
mobility studies is largely micro-class inheritance in disguise. Have conventional mobility studies in-
deed created the false impression that big-class reproduction is the dominant form of reproduction? 
We can address this question by examining whether the big-class effects that appear in conventional 
mobility analyses are much reduced in size when micro-class effects are overlaid on them. As shown 
in Table 5, we have accordingly reestimated Model A1 after omitting the micro-class inheritance terms 
(i.e., Model A3), thus replicating a conventional big-class analysis in which big-class and micro-class 
terms are confounded. The resulting trimmed model reveals again the importance of micro-class proc-
esses by returning a fit statistic that is significantly worse than that for Model A1 (i.e., L2 increases by 
20,915 with 81 df). We have reported the inheritance coefficients for the trimmed and full models in 
Figure 4. Here, attention is properly focused on the meso-class effects, as the manual-nonmanual and 
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macro-class effects are already purged of lower-order effects and will not be much affected by further 
purging at a yet more detailed level.16 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Do conventional mobility studies create the false appearance of  
big-class and meso-class immobility? A comparison of immobility  
coefficients with and without micro-class controls 
Note: Coefficients are drawn from Models A1 and A3 of Table 5 (after standardizing sample size to 
10,000 cases in each country). For convenience in presentation, the two primary sector 
coefficients are each divided by two. 
 
                                                     
16 The manual-nonmanual and macro-class effects will in fact be identical in the trimmed and full models when the 
gradational term is omitted. The primary sector effect, which we have formally labelled a macro-class effect, is 
in this context similar to a meso-class effect because the micro-class effects are the only effects nested within 
it. It follows that the primary sector effect can weaken in the presence of micro-class controls. 
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It bears noting first that the meso-class effects under the trimmed model are indeed strong and 
roughly in line with the effects secured in conventional mobility analyses. The coefficient for managers, 
for example, implies that children born into the managerial class are 1.62 times more likely to remain 
in that class than to exit it (i.e., e.48≈1.62). The corresponding inheritance coefficients for craft workers, 
lower manual workers, and service workers are 1.40, 1.63, and 1.93 respectively. It is coefficients 
such as these, all of which are net of gradational effects, that have motivated generations of mobility 
scholars to regard big-class reproduction as a powerful force.  
The results from our full model imply that this conclusion, for all its popularity, is somewhat misleading. 
When micro-class effects are allowed, we find that some big-class effects are greatly reduced in 
strength (i.e., classical professions, sales, clerical), while others disappear altogether or become quite 
small (i.e., managers and officials, other professionals, craft workers, service workers, lower manual 
workers). It follows that much of the putative big-class reproduction appearing in conventional big-
class analyses is generated only because it is confounded with micro-class reproduction.17 This is not 
to suggest that all big-class reproduction is just micro-class reproduction in disguise. Clearly, some 
big-class reproduction persists even in the presence of micro-class controls, a result that was also 
revealed in Figure 3.  
For many mobility analysts, the distinction between big-class and gradational processes is not 
stressed, and the objective instead is to estimate for each big class a total effect that incorporates the 
hierarchical position of that class. It is therefore useful to present results that are consistent with this 
specification. Also, some analysts prefer to allocate self-employed workers into a petty bourgeoisie 
class, again an operational decision that is adopted frequently enough that it is worth considering how 
it might affect our own results. We have accordingly recalculated the results of Figure 4 after omitting 
the gradational term and restricting the sample to self-employed fathers. The estimates under this 
specification, as presented in Figure 5, are slightly more favorable for big-class proponents. In par-
ticular, the classical profession effect remains quite strong in the presence of micro-class controls, 
implying that children born into the classical professions profit from a pronounced gradational effect. It 
should be noted that the coefficients for the other inheritance terms are less affected (except perhaps 
sales). Although there are, then, somewhat more residual big-class effects under this alternative 
specification, the difference is not so great as to alter our main conclusion that the big-class reproduc-
tion appearing in conventional analyses is largely generated by the tendency for children to inherit 
their micro-class. 
                                                     
17 The gradational effect, which is not reported in Figure 4, does not decline as precipitously when micro-class 
effects are included. The gradational effect from the model without micro-class effects is 1.26, while the 
gradational effect from the model with such effects is 1.14. 
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Figure 5. A comparison of immobility coefficients with and without micro-class 
controls for self-employed fathers and omitted status gradient 
Note: Coefficients are from Models A2 and A3 (omitting the status gradient) in Table 5 after selecting 
on employed fathers (N=200,662) and standardizing the sample size to 10,000 cases in each 
country. For Model A2, L2=19,581; df=24,101; Δ=22.1; BIC=-235,958. For Model A3, 
L2=23,778; df=24,182; Δ=24.5; BIC=-232,620. For convenience in presentation, the two primary 
sector coefficients are each divided by two. 
 
Women’s mobility and the fungibility hypothesis 
We next ask whether the same conclusion holds for daughters. In a related analysis, we examine 
micro-class inheritance patterns for daughters in greater detail, but here we only review select results 
of special relevance. We focus on results that are relevant to the claim that most children are princi-
pally interested in inheriting their big class but will often attempt to achieve this big-class objective by 
pursuing a more detailed form of micro-class inheritance. The “fungibility hypothesis” implies that 
micro-class inheritance is nothing more than a particular form of big-class inheritance that is pursued 
mainly because it serves to realize the big-class aspirations of children. The son of a dentist, for 
example, may well be principally oriented to remaining in the professional class even while appre-
ciating that the safest path to achieving that diffuse big-class objective is to exploit the considerable 
illiquid, occupation-specific resources (e.g., networks, training) that his parents can convey. Because 
of gender segregation, micro-class inheritance is often a less viable alternative for daughters, implying 
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that their big-class aspirations can only be realized via out-mobility from their father’s occupation. The 
results for women may in this regard be understood as providing a critical negative test of the fungibil-
ity hypothesis.  
As shown in Table A1, all but two of our surveys include data for women, and we analyze here all 
those surveys.  Although a few of the surveys include data on mother’s occupation,  we will restrict our 
Table 7. Basic coefficients of immobility for women (N=189,786) 
Coefficients Baseline model No status gradient 
I. Status (SES)1 1.03  
II. Big class   
A. Manual-nonmanual .28 .57 
B. Macro class   
1. Professional-managerial .29 .55 
2. Proprietor .82 .93 
3. Routine non-manual -.21 -.34 
4. Manual -.26 -.39 
5. Primary .88 1.07 
C. Meso class   
1. Classical professions .44 1.15 
2. Managers & officials .04 -.01 
3. Other professions .01 -.22 
4. Sales .17 .20 
5. Clerical .22 .23 
6. Craft .06 .01 
7. Lower manual .03 .06 
8. Service workers -.17 -.16 
III. Micro class2   
1. Classical professions 1.15 1.20 
2. Managers & officials  1.08 1.12 
3. Other professions .68 .92 
4. Sales .45 .55 
5. Clerical .12 .16 
6. Craft 1.13 1.14 
7. Lower manual 1.36 1.37 
8. Service workers .71 .78 
9. Primary 1.78 1.81 
1 Coefficient multiplied by 1000 for convenience in presentation. 
2 Average of micro-class coefficients within meso classes 
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attention here to father-by-daughter tables, leaving the more complicated three-way analyses to a 
follow-up paper.18 The occupation coding, big-class coding, and mobility models are otherwise the 
same as for the preceding male analyses. We present in Table 7 the inheritance coefficients for our 
father-by-daughter tables estimated under the model of common social fluidity (i.e., see Models A1 
and A2, Table 5).19 
The coefficients for micro-class inheritance in Table 7 are relatively weak (compared to the corre-
sponding coefficients for men), but the fall-off for women is not as dramatic as might be anticipated 
given how extreme sex segregation is in all four of our countries (see Charles and Grusky 2004). The 
gender disparity is especially attenuated in the classic professions; here, a woman is 3.2 times more 
likely to inherit her father’s occupation than to move to some other classic profession (e1.15≈3.2), only 
about 23 percent smaller than the corresponding estimate (i.e., 4.2) for a man. It is striking that micro-
class inheritance remains quite strong even when sex segregation putatively works to undermine it. If 
ever there were a home ground for a big-class reproduction story, it would presumably have to be the 
father-by-daughter mobility table. 
We can still salvage the fungibility hypothesis insofar as there is evidence among women of compen-
satory big-class reproduction. There is, however, little such evidence to be found. To the contrary, 
Table 7 reveals that (a) women’s big-class coefficients are much smaller than their micro-class coeffi-
cients (save, again, for proprietors and the primary sector), and (b) women’s big-class coefficients are 
not consistently larger than the corresponding men’s big-class coefficients. The slightly weakened 
micro-class reproduction among women does not, then, appear to produce any compensatory in-
crease in big-class reproduction. Although we cannot pretend to a definitive test of the fungibility 
hypothesis, there is certainly little to be found here in support of it. 
Cross-national variation in relative mobility 
We have to this point made the case for a micro-class approach in general terms, but we appreciate 
that the institutions that support micro-class reproduction are better developed in some countries (e.g., 
Germany) than in others (e.g., Japan). Likewise, some countries have well-developed big-class 
institutions (e.g., Sweden), whereas others have backed alternative institutions, such as craft unions, 
that can serve to undermine big classes (e.g., United States). The four countries analyzed here were 
selected for the purpose of representing this variability in micro-class and big-class institutionalization. 
At least until recently (e.g., Breen 2004), the widely accepted view has been that big-class mobility is 
cross-nationally quite similar, a conclusion that may have proven more attractive than was warranted 
because standard mobility models cannot capture such variability as obtains at the micro-class level. 
                                                     
18 We reexamine the fungibility hypothesis with a three-way classification of mother’s occupation, father’s 
occupation, and daughter’s occupation. 
19 The sample size is 189,786 cases. The L2 statistic for Model A1 is 24,239 (with 22,826 df), and the L2 statistic 
for Model A2 is 28,289 (with 22,827 df). We report in Table 7 the coefficients that obtain when sample sizes are 
standardized to 10,000 cases. 
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The question that then arises is whether our 2х2 typology (i.e., Table 2) adequately represents the 
structure of cross-national variability. Additionally, we wish to examine the extent of occupational 
reproduction in Japan and other putatively “deoccupationalized” labor markets, thereby revealing the 
reach of the micro-class form and the extent to which it is a generic feature of contemporary societies. 
We address these questions by estimating a series of models in Panel B of Table 5 that reveal the 
various ways in which our four mobility regimes are similar or different. The first model in Panel B 
allows all father-by-son interaction terms to vary freely across countries, while the second model in 
Panel B forces such variability to be captured in a set of country-specific shift parameters pertaining to 
each type of inheritance and exchange (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992a; Xie 1992). We also estimate 
this model without the gradational term (Model B3). The final model in Panel B fits for each country a 
single shift parameter that pertains at once to all inheritance terms. If this model fits, it implies that a 
country with an excess or deficit of micro-inheritance must also have a corresponding excess or deficit 
of meso-class, macro-class, and manual-nonmanual inheritance. The logic of this model is accordingly 
inconsistent with our expectation that micro-class and big-class inheritance can vary independently of 
one another (see Table 2). We have argued, for example, that the United States embodies strong 
micro-class reproduction and weak big-class reproduction, whereas Sweden embodies weak micro-
class reproduction and strong big-class reproduction.  
The BIC statistics of Table 5 suggest that cross-national variability can indeed be summarized with a 
set of country-specific shift parameters (i.e., Model B2). At the same time, these shift parameters must 
also be allowed to vary across the four types of inheritance, as the BIC and L2 statistics increase sub-
stantially when a single shift parameter for each country is imposed (i.e., Model B4). We will therefore 
confine our discussion to Model B2 and its analogue, Model B3, that omits the gradational term. The 
coefficients of exchange and mobility for these two models are presented in Table 8.  
The first column of Table 8 shows baseline estimates in which the United States is taken as reference 
category. As before, the full complement of 82 micro-class effects is not presented, and instead meso-
class averages of these effects are reported. The adjacent columns in Table 8 indicate whether Swe-
den, Germany, and Japan deviate from the reference country (i.e., the United States) for the grada-
tional parameter and for each of the four types of inheritance parameters.  
The estimates in this table suggest three conclusions. First, gradational effects are strongest in Ger-
many and weakest in Japan, with the United States and Sweden taking middling positions. Second, 
the manual-nonmanual and meso-class terms are much the same in each country, whereas macro-
class effects are somewhat stronger in Sweden and Germany than in the United States and Japan. 
Third, micro-class effects are strong in Germany and Japan, yet comparatively weak in the United 
States, especially relative to our expectations (as expressed in Table 2). 
We can conclude, then, that the macro-class parameters do show the anticipated cross-national dif-
ferences, but these are modest in size and arguably consistent with the conventional view that a fun-
damental “family resemblance” cuts across all contemporary industrial big-class mobility regimes 
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Table 8. Coefficients of cross-national variation in immobility for men 
 
1 Model B2, Table 5 
2 Model B4, Table 5 
3 Coefficient multiplied by 1000 for convenience in presentation. 
4 Base values are mean of micro-class coefficients within each meso class and within the primary 
macro class. 
ns Not significant at the 0.05 level 
 Baseline model 1  No status gradient 2 
Coefficients  
U.S. 
Base 
JP  
Shift 
GE 
Shift 
SW 
Shift 
 U.S. 
Base 
JP 
Shift 
GE 
Shift 
SW 
Shift 
I. Status (SES)3 1.13 -.23 .49 .04 ns     
II. Big class         
A. Manual-nonmanual .34 -.07 ns -.11 -.13 .70 -.16 -.06 ns -.18 
B. Macro class  .10 .32 .24  .11 .34 .24 
1. Prof.-manag. -.14    .20    
2. Proprietor .92    .93    
3. Routine non. -.18    -.38    
4. Manual -.30    -.43    
5. Primary 1.49    1.72    
C. Meso class  .08 ns -.10 -.06  .08 ns -.10 -.04 
1. Classical prof. .33    1.06    
2. Man. & off. .26    .11    
3. Other prof. -.07    -.27    
4. Sales .55    .55    
5. Clerical .19    .16    
6. Craft .09    .03 ns    
7. Lower man. .22    .25    
8. Service .14    .13    
III. Micro class4  .40 .48 .10  .40 .50 .11 
1. Classical prof. 1.10    1.16    
2. Man. & off. .62    .66    
3. Other prof. 1.54    1.68    
4. Sales .84    .95    
5. Clerical .16    .20    
6. Craft 1.80    1.80    
7. Lower man. 1.73    1.75    
8. Service 1.24    1.33    
9. Primary 2.00    2.04    
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(Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992a). Of the big-class effects in Table 8, the very largest pertains to the 
U.S.-German contrast for macro-class inheritance, with Germany returning a parameter here that is 
only 1.38 times stronger than that for the United States (i.e., e.32≈1.38). As anticipated, the micro-class 
parameters are somewhat more variable, but even here one finds consistently extreme micro-class 
reproduction. Indeed, even in countries with poorly-developed occupational training, such as Sweden 
and Japan, it is difficult not to be impressed with how much micro-class reproduction there is. The 
Japanese results are especially notable in this regard and do not conform at all to conventional ex-
pectations. In fact, micro-class reproduction in Japan is 1.49 times stronger than micro-class repro-
duction in the United States (i.e., e.40≈1.49), a result that reflects not just surprisingly strong micro-
class reproduction in Japan but also unexpectedly weak micro-class reproduction in the United States. 
The prominence of micro-class inheritance in Japan is so unexpected that we have carried out addi-
tional analyses to cast light on it. In Table A3, we report on an analysis that divides the Japanese data 
into subsamples pertaining to fathers who work in large firms, small firms, and the public sector.20 The 
resulting model, again based on a simple shift-effect specification, reveals that there is 1.73 times 
more micro-class inheritance in the small-firm sector than in the large-firm sector (e.55≈1.73). Because 
relatively few fathers work in the large-firm or public sectors (approx. 20.5% in our samples), the 
pooled parameter estimates reported in Table 8 principally reflect the small-firm sector, where micro-
class processes are not at all weak. It follows that, just as the ideal type implies, Japanese occupa-
tionalization is indeed suppressed, but only for the minority of workers employed in large firms or in 
the public sector. 
In motivating our cross-national analysis, we suggested that the big-class mobility model was tailor-
made for Sweden, whereas it potentially distorted mobility processes in Germany and the United 
States by (a) ignoring micro-level rigidities and thus underestimating how unequal contemporary mo-
bility regimes are, and (b) misrepresenting micro-level reproduction as a more diffuse form of big-class 
reproduction. The results presented in this section suggest that the big-class model cannot well repre-
sent the structure of social mobility even in Sweden and the numerically dominant small-firm economy 
of Japan. Although micro-level inheritance is somewhat suppressed in Sweden and large-firm Japan, 
it remains such a prominent source of rigidity even in these labor markets that there is little justification 
for continuing to ignore it. 
 
Conclusions  
The scholarly literature on social mobility has treated questions about the form of mobility as resolv-
able principally by fiat rather than evidence. For the most part, the convention has simply been to 
assume that intergenerational reproduction takes one of two forms, either a categorical form that has 
                                                     
20 We have defined large firms as those with 30 or more employees. Although this is a relatively low threshold, we 
are still able to secure a strong firm size effect (see below). It is of course plausible that this effect would be yet 
larger for more stringently defined “large” firms. 
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parents passing on a big-class position to their children, or a gradational form that has parents passing 
on their socioeconomic standing to their children. The purpose of our paper has been to consider 
whether these conventional representations of the structure of mobility are incomplete. We have sug-
gested that occupations are an important conduit for reproduction and that incorporating this conduit 
into mobility models will improve our understanding of the mobility process.  
The results from our cross-nationally harmonized data for the United States, Sweden, Germany, and 
Japan bear out this argument. We have found that conventional models misrepresent the structure of 
opportunity in two ways: (a) the mobility regime appears in standard analyses as more fluid than it 
truly is (i.e., overestimated fluidity), and (b) the main rigidities in the mobility regime have been taken 
as evidence of big-class reproduction when in fact occupational reproduction is the principal underly-
ing mechanism (i.e., misrepresented form). We argue below that these results should trouble those 
who take relative mobility rates as a core indicator of inequality of opportunity.  
Although this occupational mechanism is more entrenched in some countries than in others, we have 
shown that it is too prominent to ignore in any of the countries we studied. The coefficients for occupa-
tional inheritance are very strong in Germany and quite strong in the United States and Sweden. Even 
in Japan, which has long been regarded as distinctively “deoccupationalized,” there is evidence of 
very strong occupational rigidities. These results imply that a micro-class reproduction mechanism has 
impressive cross-national reach and may well be a fundamental feature of all contemporary mobility 
regimes.  
Why are occupations such an important conduit for social reproduction? In all countries, parents ac-
cumulate much occupation-specific capital, identify with their occupation, and accordingly “bring 
home” their occupation in ways that then make it salient to their children and lead them to invest in it. It 
follows that children develop a taste for occupational reproduction, are trained in the requisite skills for 
occupational reproduction, and have access to the occupational networks that facilitate occupational 
reproduction. Additionally, employers or training institutions (e.g., professional schools) may some-
times discriminate in favor of workers or students who have a long family involvement in their chosen 
trade or profession, a potentially important demand-side source of occupational reproduction. In sub-
sequent analyses, it would be useful to examine the role of aspirations, training, networks, and dis-
crimination in furthering micro-class reproduction, surely an important task insofar as any headway is 
to be made in reducing such reproduction. 
We have to this point studiously avoided the question of whether inequalities at the micro-class level 
are as normatively troubling as strictly gradational inequalities involving access to widely valued social 
rewards (e.g., income, prestige). This question is important because it speaks directly to whether we 
should much care about the micro-class rigidities that we have uncovered here. Do these rigidities 
imply that we must now rededicate ourselves to far more extensive ameliorative efforts? Or do they 
pertain to mere horizontal distinctions that are trivial in their normative implications and, insofar as they 
are to be addressed at all, are best understood as a purely secondary concern? 
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It might well be tempting to take the position that micro-class inequalities are not all that objectionable. 
Should we really care, in other words, that the son of the truck driver is very likely to become a truck 
driver while the son of a gardener is very likely to become a gardener? Must we truly commit our-
selves to equal access to truck driving and gardening? In answering this question, it is important to 
recognize that, insofar as we choose to leave micro-class reproduction untouched, it is tantamount to 
deciding that big-class reproduction should also be left largely untouched. Put differently, a main rea-
son why we should care about the immobility of truck drivers and gardeners is not that truck driving 
and gardening are understood as crucially different in their relative attractiveness, but rather because 
micro-class immobility of this sort is the principal mechanism ensuring that the working class repro-
duces itself. The results from our models indeed make it clear that big-class reproduction arises 
largely because children frequently remain within their micro class of origin. It follows that one cannot 
blithely dismiss occupational rigidities as normatively unimportant without also believing that big-class 
rigidities are normatively unimportant. 
The committed gradationalist might at this point respond that she or he cannot be bullied into caring 
about micro-class rigidities just because they are the main foundation of net big-class rigidities. What if 
such big-class rigidities are themselves unimportant? If there is no normative rationale for caring about 
net big-class rigidities, then obviously one cannot leverage an interest in micro-class rigidities via 
them. The latter reaction, which we elaborate below, thus requires us to commit to the view that we 
ought not care much about either big-class or micro-class rigidities (once gradational effects are 
netted out) and that instead we should focus first and foremost on gradational inequalities. Below, we 
lay out the main rationale for that position, and we then compare it with two alternatives that suggest 
that we should care about net micro-class or big-class rigidities. 
Socioeconomic imperialists: The radical gradationalist position rests on the view that we should 
care mainly about ensuring that everyone, regardless of origins, has an equal opportunity to secure 
consensually-valued rewards. If one thought, for example, that socioeconomic status exhausted all the 
rewards that mattered, it would follow that the socioeconomic component of the total origin-by-desti-
nation association is the only normatively problematic component. By implication, the micro-class or 
big-class rigidities that persist after removing all socioeconomic association would have to be under-
stood as quite unimportant, revealing as they do non-hierarchical affinities rather than true inequalities 
of access to the rewards that matter (i.e., socioeconomic status). Under this formulation, there is no 
need, for example, to worry that the children of truck drivers are more likely to become truck drivers 
than are the children of gardeners, insofar as truck drivers and gardeners are equivalent socio-
economically. Likewise, there is no need to concern ourselves with net big-class effects, as here too 
such affinities signal purely horizontal difference rather than unequal access to the rewards that mat-
ter. To be sure, the socioeconomic imperialist should care about the “total” big-class and micro-class 
effects that emerge whenever a socioeconomic term is omitted from a mobility model, but these 
effects are of interest only to the extent that they reflect that omitted socioeconomic term. 
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Big-class and micro-class multidimensionalists: The latter conclusion stands or falls on the 
assumption that socioeconomic status exhausts all the rewards that matter. If one instead adopts a 
multidimensional view of the inequality space in which many rewards matter (e.g., authority, auton-
omy, income, prestige, wealth), then net big-class or micro-class rigidities are also objectionable 
insofar as they signal unequal access to these non-socioeconomic rewards. The attraction of a big-
class or micro-class framework is precisely that the constituent categories are organic bundles of a 
great many consensually-valued rewards, not just prestige or status but also other desirable goods 
and conditions. Although one might attempt to model the mobility table by reducing occupations to 
these constituent dimensions (e.g., Hout 1984), one can alternatively allow classes to simply “stand in” 
for these rewards and understand that class reproduction is generated by this complicated amalgam 
of rewards. When we uncover, then, a net tendency for professional reproduction (after purging all 
socioeconomic association), it is partly because the professional class has a cumulation of multidi-
mensional advantages that is passed on to children and that allows them to reproduce their origins at 
a higher rate than mere socioeconomic advantage would imply. By implication, a class theorist should 
care about the non-socioeconomic association in the mobility table because, at least in part, it is sig-
naling a more complicated pattern of cumulative advantage and disadvantage than simple socioeco-
nomic scales can possibly capture.  
Open society advocates: There is no disputing, however, that some of the non-socioeconomic asso-
ciation that we have uncovered is purely horizontal in structure. If we assume, for example, that truck 
drivers and gardeners are equally desirable on all the dimensions that are consensually valued, then 
the tendency for self-reproduction within each of these micro-classes should be understood as a 
purely horizontal form of association in the mobility table. Is there any reason to be troubled by such 
horizontal association? We think there still is. It must in this regard be appreciated that the association 
in a mobility table is of interest to scholars of inequality for two quite different reasons. To this point, 
we have only made reference to scholars who object whenever social origins affect the total amount of 
rewards that will on average be available, either simple socioeconomic rewards (i.e., the socioeco-
nomic imperialists) or perhaps a more heterogeneous constellation of socioeconomic and other 
rewards (i.e., the big-class and micro-class multidimensionalists). However, a second but no less 
important reason for objecting to origin-by-destination association is that it implies that human choice 
has been circumscribed, a circumscription that is wholly determined by the accident of birth. We care, 
in other words, that the truck driver is fated to become a truck driver at birth because that amounts to a 
stripping away of choice, and most of us would embrace an open society in which choices are 
expanded, not stripped away. Although our illustrative non-choice (i.e., being a truck driver vs. gar-
dener) may not have implications for total rewards (of the sort that are consensually valued), it is 
nonetheless a fateful non-choice that determines the texture and content of a human life. It is this 
commitment to an open society, sometimes left quite implicit, that underlies the discipline’s long-
standing interest in monitoring marital homogamy, occupational sex segregation, and many other 
forms of ascription that are hybrids of vertical and horizontal processes. 
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The morale to this discussion is that only socioeconomic imperialists of the most narrow sort can dis-
miss the class inequalities that we have discovered. These inequalities should, however, be troubling 
to multidimensionalists who recognize that some of the net class association pertains to the reproduc-
tion of vertical awards as well as to “open society” theorists who care about opportunities for choice 
even when the choice at hand pertains to horizontal rather than vertical outcomes. We have not car-
ried out the comprehensive trend analysis needed to speak to the conventional view among open 
society theorists that recent human history has involved a spectacular, if sometimes fitful, expansion of 
opportunities for horizontal as well as vertical choice (e.g., decline of caste systems, occupational sex 
segregation). Although it is entirely possible that trend data would bear out this postulated trend (see 
Table 6 for suggestive contrary results), it is also clear from our results that intergenerational choice 
remains very circumscribed and that residues of caste-like reproduction persist to a greater extent 
than most of us had probably imagined. This result suggests that contemporary efforts to equalize 
opportunity have underperformed and that some rethinking of how to approach equalization may be in 
order. 
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Appendix 
Appendix Figure A1. The structure of micro-class reproduction for men 
Note: Coefficients based on Model A1 of Table 5 applied to full and employed samples (after 
standardizing sample to 10,000 cases in each country). For employed sample, L2=18,780; 
df=24,100; Δ=21.03; BIC=-236,748. For convenience in presentation, the two coefficients for 
housekeeping workers are divided by a factor of 20. 
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Appendix Table A1. Surveys for intergenerational mobility analysis 
Sample Size 
Survey  Period Ages Birth Cohorts 
Occup. 
Scheme1 
Men Women
1. Occupational 
Changes in a 
Generation I (OCG I) 
1962 30-64 1898-1932 1960 SOC 17,544 -- 
2. Occupational 
Changes in a 
Generation II (OCG II) 
1973 30-64 1909-1943 1960-70 SOC 18,856 -- 
3. General Social 
Survey (GSS) 1972-2003 30-64 1908-1970 1970-80 SOC 9,685 7,712 
4. Survey of Social 
Stratification & Mobility 
(SSM) 
1955-1995 30-64 1891-1970 Japanese SCO 6,703 1,846 
5. Japan General 
Social Survey (JGSS) 2000-2002 30-64 1936-1972 
Japanese 
SCO 1,917 2,166 
6. German Social 
Survey2 (ALLBUS) 1980-2002 30-64 1916-1972 
ISCO-68 
ISCO-88 5,647 2,403 
7. German 
Socioeconomic Panel 
(GSOEP) 
1986, 1999, 
2000 30-64 1922-1970 
ISCO-68 
ISCO-88 2,886 1,874 
8. German Life History 
Study LV I-III 1981-1989 30-64 1921-1959 ISCO-68 1,234 563 
9. ZUMA-
Standarddemographie 
Survey 
1976-1982 30-64 1912-1952 ISCO-68 2,929 1,090 
10. 1990 Swedish 
Census (linked to 1960 
& 1970 Censuses) 
1990 30-47 1943-1960 NYK80 184,451 172,132
1 SOC=Standard Occupational Classification; SCO=Standard Classification of Occupations; 
ISCO=International Standard Classification of Occupations; NYK=Nordisk yrkesklassificering. 
2 German data exclude respondents from East Germany (GDR). If respondents were not gainfully 
employed at the time of survey, last occupation was used. 
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Appendix Table A2. Micro-class frequencies for male respondents in U.S., Japan, Germany, 
and Sweden 
 
United 
States Japan Germany Sweden 
Micro-class code and category Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
1101 Jurists 351 .008 14 .002 93 .007 981 .005
1102 Health professionals 569 .012 49 .006 135 .011 2481 .013
1103 Professors & instructors 403 .009 25 .003 60 .005 1112 .006
1104 Natural scientists 207 .004 11 .001 60 .005 1038 .006
1105 Statistical & social scientists 127 .003 1 .000 88 .007 2147 .012
1106 Architects 80 .002 73 .008 72 .006 1086 .006
1107 Accountants 540 .012 8 .001 58 .005 876 .005
1108 Authors, journalists, & related writers 177 .004 15 .002 44 .003 1010 .005
1109 Engineers 1727 .037 151 .017 534 .042 4575 .025
1201 Officials, government & non-profit org. 527 .011 39 .004 62 .005 2165 .012
1202 Other managers 5053 .110 737 .085 378 .030 5251 .028
1203 Commercial managers 515 .011 85 .010 275 .022 4305 .023
1204 Building managers & proprietors 74 .002 16 .002 102 .008 1539 .008
1301 Systems analysts & programmers 274 .006 63 .007 169 .013 3783 .021
1302 Aircraft pilots and navigators 81 .002 1 .000 4 .000 146 .001
1303 Personnel & labor relations workers 153 .003 0 .000 29 .002 1773 .010
1304 Elementary & secondary teachers 860 .019 220 .025 513 .040 6343 .034
1305 Librarians 24 .001 1 .000 14 .001 361 .002
1306 Creative artists 324 .007 25 .003 78 .006 1620 .009
1307 Ship officers 49 .001 21 .002 19 .001 467 .003
1308 Professional, technical & related workers 652 .014 99 .011 120 .009 1530 .008
1309 Social & welfare workers 76 .002 15 .002 56 .004 1622 .009
1310 Workers in religion 327 .007 28 .003 38 .003 483 .003
1311 Nonmedical technicians 568 .012 19 .002 538 .042 18719 .101
1312 Health semiprofessionals 170 .004 37 .004 113 .009 1440 .008
1313 Hospital attendants 74 .002 0 .000 26 .002 1428 .008
1314 Nursery school teachers & aides 0 .000 1 .000 7 .001 519 .003
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2001 Proprietors 1840 .040 462 .053 308 .024 3098 .017
3101 Real estate agents 231 .005 36 .004 9 .001 449 .002
3102 Agents (n.e.c.) 217 .005 21 .002 87 .007 1760 .010
3103 Insurance agents 424 .009 30 .003 108 .009 373 .002
3104 Cashiers 33 .001 5 .001 3 .000 21 .000
3105 Sales workers & shop assistants 2107 .046 407 .047 263 .021 7743 .042
3201 Telephone operators 3 .000 5 .001 6 .000 101 .001
3202 Bookkeepers & related workers 271 .006 189 .022 428 .034 1884 .010
3203 Office and clerical workers 1699 .037 1045 .121 1127 .089 4398 .024
3204 Postal & mail distribution clerks 494 .011 44 .005 107 .008 2895 .016
4101 Craftsmen & kindred workers, n.e.c. 263 .006 68 .008 93 .007 484 .003
4102 Foremen 1655 .036 333 .039 318 .025 0 .000
4103 Electronics service & repair workers 598 .013 11 .001 204 .016 3174 .017
4104 Printers & related workers 297 .006 54 .006 120 .009 1854 .010
4105 Locomotive operators 171 .004 23 .003 75 .006 451 .002
4106 Electricians 479 .010 80 .009 288 .023 4889 .027
4107 
Tailors and related 
workers 134 .003 73 .008 74 .006 466 .003
4108 Vehicle mechanics 783 .017 23 .003 213 .017 2145 .012
4109 Blacksmiths & machinists 1167 .025 93 .011 757 .060 6794 .037
4110 Jewelers, opticians, & precious metal workers 64 .001 24 .003 96 .008 1094 .006
4111 Other mechanics 2086 .045 31 .004 192 .015 4863 .026
4112 Plumbers & pipe-fitters 432 .009 59 .007 187 .015 1817 .010
4113 Cabinetmakers 61 .001 57 .007 210 .017 2136 .012
4114 Bakers 43 .001 40 .005 79 .006 294 .002
4115 Welders & related metal workers 740 .016 111 .013 187 .015 4248 .023
4116 Painters 487 .011 56 .007 181 .014 2475 .013
4117 Butchers 159 .003 0 .000 72 .006 311 .002
4118 Stationary engine operators 384 .008 41 .005 78 .006 505 .003
4119 Bricklayers, carpenters, & construction workers 1444 .031 424 .049 619 .049 10101 .055
4120 Heavy machine operators 580 .013 58 .007 114 .009 2151 .012
4201 Truck drivers 1680 .036 37 .004 481 .038 8983 .049
4202 Chemical processors 431 .009 108 .012 90 .007 2686 .015
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4203 Miners & related workers 235 .005 40 .005 128 .010 645 .003
4204 Longshoremen & freight handlers 565 .012 60 .007 135 .011 3200 .017
4205 Food processing workers 330 .007 92 .011 48 .004 730 .004
4206 Textile workers 131 .003 65 .008 38 .003 182 .001
4207 Sawyers & lumber inspectors 105 .002 52 .006 17 .001 1022 .006
4208 Metal processors 409 .009 85 .010 75 .006 1118 .006
4209 Operatives & kindred workers, n.e.c. 3168 .069 430 .050 244 .019 4388 .024
4210 Forestry workers 87 .002 23 .003 36 .003 1730 .009
4301 Protective service workers 589 .013 55 .006 240 .019 3004 .016
4302 Transport conductors 45 .001 8 .001 17 .001 575 .003
4303 Guards & watchmen 446 .010 59 .007 76 .006 1217 .007
4304 Food service workers 445 .010 90 .010 60 .005 1084 .006
4305 Mass transportation operators 325 .007 272 .031 21 .002 0 .000
4306 Service workers, n.e.c. 393 .009 35 .004 50 .004 616 .003
4307 Hairdressers 172 .004 56 .006 39 .003 169 .001
4308 Delivery workers 395 .009 39 .004 3 .000 200 .001
4309 Launderers & dry-cleaners 74 .002 21 .002 11 .001 109 .001
4310 Housekeeping workers 41 .001 2 .000 12 .001 219 .001
4311 Gardeners 620 .013 25 .003 129 .010 1161 .006
4312 Janitors & cleaners 235 .005 11 .001 111 .009 3681 .020
5101 Fishermen 49 .001 85 .010 0 .000 237 .001
5201 Farmers & farm managers 1750 .038 1213 .140 299 .024 4952 .027
5202 Farm laborers 37 .001 18 .002 48 .004 769 .004
Column Totals 46085 100 8635 100 12696 100 184451 100 
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Appendix Table A3. Sectoral variation in Japanese immobility1 
 
1 L2 =5,781 with 13,134 df; BIC=-113,490; Δ=22.6.  
2 Coefficient multiplied by 1000 for convenience in presentation. 
3 Base values are mean of micro-class coefficients within each meso class and  
within the primary macro class. 
ns Not significant at the 0.05 level 
 
 Base and shift effects 
Coefficients Base Large firm Public 
I. Status (SES)2 .75 .23ns -.07ns 
II. Big class    
A. Manual-nonmanual .23 .07ns .01ns 
B. Macro class  .01ns -.12ns 
1. Prof.-manag. -.09ns   
2. Proprietor 1.23   
3. Routine non. -.11ns   
4. Manual .14   
5. Primary .73   
C. Meso class  .03ns .06ns 
1. Classical prof. .64   
2. Man. & off. -.11ns   
3. Other prof. .46   
4. Sales .32ns   
5. Clerical .46   
6. Craft -.10ns   
7. Lower manual -.07ns   
8. Service workers -.10ns   
III. Micro class 3  -.55 -.78 
1. Classical prof. 1.87   
2. Managers & off. 1.25   
3. Other prof. 2.18   
4. Sales 1.24   
5. Clerical 1.21   
6. Craft 2.82   
7. Lower manual 2.03   
8. Service workers 3.52   
9. Primary 2.09   
 
